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Defendant / Appellant. 
Case No: 20140995-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
******* 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT SUBMI1TED THE 
VERDICT-URGING INSTRUCTION TO THE JURY 
A. Colloquies with the Jury 
The State contends that when the trial court ignored the jury's question 
about the definition of "substantially caused" it was an "even-handed approach" 
which "communicated that all of the juror's views were worth consideration." 
Appellee's Replacement Brief at 21-22. According to the State, because all of the 
jurors were "concerned about with what 'substantially caused' meant and how 
this factor applied to the case" the trial court's refusal to address the concern 
would have applied equally to them all. Appellee's Replacement Brief at 22. This 
is an unrealistic of human nature in view of the record. 
1 
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When the jury told the court it was at an absolute impasse, 6-2, it made it 
very clear that the only reason they had not reached a verdict was that "two feel 
that 'substantially caused needs to be 'the majority of the time."' R.182. Logically, 
six jurors did not feel "substantially caused" needed to be the majority of the 
time. They were saying that this issue, the meaning of the term "substantially 
caused" was the only thing standing between them and a verdict. 
But the trial court did not resolve or even address the question of the jury's 
confusion of the term "substantially caused". R.280:94-95. The court read the 
supplemental instruction and sent the jury back to deliberate again. It made no 
mention of the fact that the impasse was caused by a question about the meaning 
of "substantially caused", it did not comment upon whether that concern was 
worthy of an impasse, it made no mention of the possibility of a mistrial if the 4iv 
impasse could not be resolved, and it made no attempt to instruct them on how to 
persist in deadlock if it they were committed to do so. Instead it ignored the 
problem and told them how important this trial was, and that the trial had been 
done well, implying that the jury should be able to reach a verdict, even without 
knO\ving what "substantially caused" meant. 
The State asserts that because the "jury's note indicated here that its 
impasse went to a definition, not to the verdict, the trial court's request for the 
jury to continue deliberating was sound." Appellee's Brief at 25. Appellate 
counsel cannot make sense of this distinction. It is as if the State is admitting that 
an impasse as to the verdict would have been more significant (and thus more 
2 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
necessary to honor with a mistrial) than an impasse as to the meaning of special 
mitigation. But this distinction is meaningless, especially in this case. 
There was no question in the evidence that Scott shot his vdfe. There was no 
question about whether or not he was guilty of murder. The only question for the 
jury to decide was whether or not special mitigation applied. And according to 
the jury, that question came do\\711 to the meaning of the term "substantially 
caused" and the degree to which Scott's own conduct contributed to his 
emotional distress. This impasse not only "went to a definition", it went to Scott's 
qualification for special mitigation, it ,,vent to the verdict. In the juror's minds, if 
the minority of jurors was right, and "substantially caused" required the State to 
prove Scott caused his own emotional distress the majority of the time, according 
to the jurors, Scott could have qualified for special mitigation. If the majority was 
right, and "substantially caused" did not require the State to prove Scott caused 
this own distress the majority of the time, according to the jurors, Scott may not 
have qualified for special mitigation. 
But the trial court's response to the jury's note led the jurors to believe that 
their concerns about the meaning of "substantially caused", and in turn the 
merits of special mitigation, were not serious enough to prevent a verdict. See 
Appellant's Replacement Brief at 34-35. Even though they had told the judge this 
issue had caused an "absolute impasse", they were told because trials are difficult 
and expensive, they need to continue to deliberate. They were told to get over this 
impasse. This told the two jurors that their belief about the meaning of 
3 
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"substantially caused" was insignificant in comparison to the value of the trial, 
and the need for a verdict. In reality, the jurors in the minority were told they 
needed to stop worrying about the meaning of "substantially caused". The 
supplemental instruction, by not addressing the concern raised by the jury, 
instructed the jury to ignore the concern. This was coercive. 
B. ABA Guidelines 
The State claims in its brief that the trial court followed the ABA guidelines 
by giving an instruction prior to deliberations, and then, when it appeared the 
jury was unable to agree, it gave a supplemental instruction. Appellee's Brief at 
23. This is technically accurate as far as it goes. What the State does not 
acknowledge is that the supplemental instruction was not consistent '"rith the 
ABA guidelines. These inconsistencies, combined vvith the context in which the 
instruction was provided, made the supplemental instruction coercive under the 
circumstances. 
Instruction 26 is a proper instruction, nearly identical to the instruction 
recommended by the ABA. It discloses that the jury has a duty to deliberate (note 
it says nothing of any obligation to reach a verdict), it directs the jurors to decide 
the case for themselves, to change their opinion if convinced it is erroneous, and 
it directs jurors to not surrender their honest convictions for the "mere purpose 
of returning a verdict". R.185. This is a proper, non-coercive instruction, and if 
the trial court had merely repeated it, Scott would not be raising this claim on 
appeal. But instead of following the ABA recommendations, to "give or repeat an 
4 
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r,c\ 
Wil 
instruction as provided" in the ABA standard, the trial court crafted its own 
supplemental instruction, one which contained considerations not provided in 
the ABA standards. See R.180. 1 
The jury had properly been instructed in Instruction 26, and after knowing 
that they should not "surrender [their] honest convictions" they told the judge 
they "are at an absolute impasse" because they disagreed about the meaning of 
the term "substantially caused". R.182. As explained by trial counsel, this note 
told the judge "they have discussed it with each other and they cannot come to an 
agreement that they are differing opinions which they cannot come to an 
agreement, and that continuing to deliberate \r\rill make it so that somebody has to 
give up their honestly held convictions." R.280:82-83. After the jury made the 
nature of their absolute impasse known, rather than merely repeating the 
uncoercive ABA instruction as recommended by the ABA, the trial court responds 
with its own instruction describing the "significant expenditure of time and 
effort" involved in the trial, telling the jury that the trial had been tried the best it 
could be and they should not expect that another trial would be easier to resolve. 
R.180. 
Just like the coercive instruction in State v. Harry, 2008 UT App 224, the 
1 The State's citation to the ABA recommendation is incomplete. The State asserts 
that the guideline directs that a "court may require the jury to continue their 
deliberations and may give or repeat an instruction." Appellee's Brief at 23. But 
the guideline actually directs that the court "may give or repeat an instruction as 
provided in section (a)." ABA §5.4(b) (emphasis added). This error in the State's 
citation is important in light of the fact that the State is supporting a 
supplemental instruction that contains factors not provided in section (a). 
5 
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supplemental instruction here came after the jury had expressed its inability to 
reach a verdict and directed the jury to consider the "significant expenditure of 
time and effort" of a trial. This consideration, when considered in context, placed 
on the jury and undue burden of having to consider how much trouble it would 
be to try the case again. Taking all these factors into account, this Court should 
have substantial doubts about the integrity of the jury's deliberation process. 
II. TRIAL COUNSEL PROVIDED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE WHEN 
IT FAILED ADMIT THE THREAT TESTIMONY SUPPORTING 
SPECIAL MITIGATION 
A. Deficient Performance 
The State has characterized the second issue incorrectly. It claims Scott is 
challenging trial counsel's effectiveness by trying to prove he was "ineffective for 
not seeking admission of the specific wording of the victim's alleged threat". 
Appellee's Replacement Brief at 2 (emphasis added). This is misdirection. There 
can be no doubt, trial counsel sought admission of the threat evidence. The 
record is clear, the defense wanted to admit the content of the threat and the trial 
court stopped it based on an incorrect hearsay objection. The State is now trying 
to rewrite the record by inventing some tactical purpose utterly rebutted by the ~ 
record. The State believes that if it can persuade the Court that trial counsel 
consciously decided not to admit the threat testimony, then it can show this was a 
reasonable tactical decision. But in order to persuade the Court that the evidence 
was not admitted because counsel did not want to admit it, the State must 
6 
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persuade the Court not to look at the record. Scott hopes the Court vfill not be 
persuaded. 
According to the State, trial counsel may have believed that having the jury 
hear the words Teresa used to threaten Scott was not as helpful to the defense as 
only having the jury learn that some unspecific threat was made. Therefore, 
according to the State, trial counsel did "not seek to admit the specific words of 
Teresa's alleged threat." Appellee' s Replacement Brief at 32. In some hypothetical 
world, in some make believe trial, this could have been the story we tell. But in 
the real world, in this case, where we have a recording of what happened, this 
explanation is manifestly inaccurate. 
Look to the record. It is perfectly clear, the defense sought to admit the 
threat evidence. R.278:113, R.291:113. 2 Scott was on the stand testifying about all 
the circumstances which led to his emotional distress before the shooting. He 
talked about the history of fighting between he and his wife. He talked about the 
fighting in the days and hours immediately before the fight. He talked about the 
guns kept in the safe under the dresser, and about how the safe had been opened 
and one of those guns, the silver one that belonged to Teresa, had been removed 
from the safe. All of this testimony led to the point at which Scott was going to tell 
2 After Scott had testified that he began about the threat on Wednesday after 
seeing the gun missing from the safe, trial counsel asked "When you say a threat 
was made, are you saying - who threatened who?" R.278:113. Scott was not 
allowed to answer. Defense counsel then tried to have Scott disclose what he was 
thinking, but because Scott "was thinking [about] the threat [he] had received the 
day before" the court again stopped the testimony. R.278:113. 
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the jury that Teresa had threatened to shoot him "Vvith the exact gun that was now 
missing from the safe.3 
After trial counsel had elicited all this evidence, after he had laid the 
groundwork for the threat evidence that would have tied the gun to Scott's 
distress, when Scott tried to disclose the details of the threat the State 
immediately objected as hearsay. Defense counsel then failed to respond that the 
evidence was non-hearsay, and the trial court sustained the State's objection. ~-
This failure is difficult to explain, perhaps in the heat of trial counsel's mind went 
blank, perhaps he is not as familiar with the rules of evidence as he should be. 
Whatever the reason, the failure to respond was an error. And the State's attempt 
to turn that error into strategy is a fantasy, easily rebutted by the record. 
Never again did the defense refer to the non-specific threat. Counsel did not ~ 
argue in closing that the threat caused Scott to fear for his life, or that this non-
specific threat was the source of Scott's distress. Defense counsel did not 
encourage the jury to "imagine what the words were", or even remind them that a 
threat had been made. Appellee's Replacement Brief at 34. The trial court had 
ruled, there ,,vas no way to "dance around and get a threat" admitted. R.291:113. 
As far as the trial court was concerned, the threat evidence had not been 
admitted, so it was no longer part of the defense's argument in support of special 
mitigation. The State now attempts to rewrite history and create an imaginary 
3 This is further supported by both Scott's and Gale's affidavits attached to Scott's 
23B Motion for Remand. They both make it patently clear, the defense intended 
to introduce the specific details of Teresa's threat. 
8 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
world where defense counsel takes advantage of the trial court's erroneous 
hearsay ruling in order to improve the mitigation defense, wherein the jury's 
imagination runs wild considering all the horrible and distressing things 
someone4 may have said to Scott. This is unreasonable. 
According to the State, "once the trial court ruled the statement 
inadmissible hearsay, counsel may well have reconsidered and concluded that he 
would actually be better off without the specifics." Appellee's Replacement Brief 
at 34. This is a strange argument. According to the State, after the court excluded 
the evidence defense counsel then decided it didn't want to admit it. As if he had 
any choice at that point. Counsel had failed to properly argue the rules of 
evidence and the court had ruled against him. This imagined after-the-fact 
change in tactic cannot qualify as a conceivable tactical basis justifying counsel's 
initial error. It cannot be a reasonable tactical strategy to incorrectly argue the 
rules of evidence in the first place and then decide you are better off having been 
wrong. 
And even if the State's argument made sense in theory, it finds no support 
in the record, and in fact ignores the portions of the record where the State 
argued the exact opposite point. The record clearly shows it was not, and could 
not have been, trial counsel's intent to use the lack of specific evidence to his 
4 Although the State presumes the jury would have known it was Teresa who 
made the unspecified threat, based on the testimony, and the Court preventing 
Scott from answering "who threatened who?", it is not clear the jury would have 
even knO"wn who's threat to imagine. R.278:113. 
9 
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advantage. 
First of all, nothing in trial counsel's conduct after the court ruled the 
threat was inadmissible shows he was able to magnify the effect of Scott's limited 
testimony about the threat. Although the term 'threat' is used many times after 
the judge's hearsay ruling, the majority of those instances were when the State 
was trying to prove Scott had threatened Teresa at earlier times, or when the 
State argued Teresa was not threatening Scott when he shot her.s Not once did ~ 
defense counsel argue, or even imply, that the unspecified threat from Teresa to 
Scott played a role in special mitigation.6 Not once did defense counsel even bring 
out the fact that Teresa had made an unspecified but serious threat to Scott, and 
not once did counsel direct the jury to infer "that the threat was greater than what 
it actually was." Appellee's Replacement Brief at 19. Defense counsel did not and 
could not tactically expect the jury would magnify the vague notion of the threat 
s See R.278:150 (on cross-examination Scott is asked whether he threatened 
Teresa during their fights); R.278:151-52 (on cross-examination Scott is asked 
about profanity and threats throughout their marriage); R.278:168 (on re-direct 
Scott clarified that the profanity and threats throughout the marriage were also 
used by Teresa against Scott); R.279:82 (Thayne Scott testified he didn't think 
Teresa ever threatened Scott); R.279:86-87 (Thayne Scott testified Scott 
threatened to kill Teresa "multiple times", "10 or 12" times); R.279:89 (Thayne 
Scott testified he could not think of any threats during a specific fight involving 
the garage door); R.280:36 (in closing the State argued Scott's children heard 
him threaten to kill her); R.280:40 (in closing the State argued Teresa "was no 
threat" to Scott while she was sitting on the bed). None of these references to a 
threat involved the defense using Scott's limited testimony about the unspecified 
threat. 
6 Defense counsel does use the term 'threatened" in closing one time but it is in 
context of describing the difference between self-defense and special mitigation. 
R.280:43. He makes no reference to the threat Scott was prevented from 
describing to the jury. 
10 
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from the limited testimony Scott was allm,ved to give. Instead, the record shows 
counsel was forced to abandon the threat evidence, and its role in special 
mitigation, altogether when the court ruled the threat was inadmissible. 
Secondly, by the State's own argument at trial, there was "no basis" in the 
evidence, without the specific language of the threat, to support Scott's fear that 
Teresa had "it out for him and she's going to shoot him." R.279:14. The State 
argued, to prevent Scott from having the jury instructe~ on the defense of special 
mitigation, that Scott "created this scenario [in his mind] where she was trying to 
kill him or had some harmful intent toward him and there is no basis for that in 
the facts that he was seeing." R.279:17. The State noted "according to [Scott's] 
testimony" Teresa was in the room and the gun was missing from the safe but 
"she doesn't make any threatening gestures to him, she doesn't brandish the gun, 
she doesn't point the gun at him ... [,] [m]aybe she was cleaning it, maybe she was 
changing it from defensive ammunition to target ammunition ... but there is no 
basis, there is nothing in the evidence to suggest that ... her having the gun out of 
the safe, merely having it out was any threat to him or that he had any reason to 
take it that way." R.279:13. The State emphasized the lack of testimony about the 
gun, "I think that idea is also really bolstered by the fact that he made it very clear 
that a gun has never been introduced into any of their disputes." R.279:13-14. 
But the State was only able to argue this because trial counsel had failed to 
properly respond to the erroneous hearsay objection. It certainly would not have 
been the case that the gun had not been introduced into any of their disputes if 
11 
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Scott had been allowed to testify about Teresa's threat. At trial, when the State 
wanted to prevent Scott from having the jury instructed on special mitigation, it 
argued there was no basis to support it because no evidence about her gun had 
been introduced. The State now wants to flip 180 degrees and argue that the 
limited threat testimony presented to the jury, ,,vithout any mention of her use of 
the gun or impact of her statements on Scott, was better for Scott's special 
mitigation than evidence that was excluded. This is a complete reversal of its ~ 
position at trial and nonsensical in light of the record and the affidavits. 
There is no conceivable tactical purpose for trial counsel to have been wrong 
about whether the threat evidence being hearsay. The State's attempt to turn this 
into some plan to get non-specific threat evidence admitted is fantastical. The 
record is clear, the evidence vvas admissible, defense counsel wanted to admit it, 
when the evidence was not admitted counsel did not use its exclusion to Scott's 
advantage. This was deficient performance. 
B. Prejudice 
The State argues that Scott cannot prove prejudice because "the jury heard 
Defendant's entire mitigation defense". Appellee's Replacement Brief at 35. This 
isn't true. The entire mitigation defense included evidence of Scott's wife telling 
him she had been recently shooting her gun, that she had shot well, and that 
Scott had interpreted her statements as a threat to use the gun against him. This 
evidence, not presented to the jury, was central to Scott's mitigation defense, and 
the State's attempt to minimize or ignore it should not be taken seriously. 
12 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The standard for prejudice in an ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
requires the defendant to show there is a "reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's unprofessional errors, the results of the proceeding would have been 
different." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). This means the 
Court should look at what actually happened at trial, and consider, if things had 
been properly done, is there a reasonable chance Scott could have received a 
different outcome. But rather than looking at the record in this case and 
considering what actually happened, the State's arguments on this point avoid 
the relevant portions of the record as much as possible, because to examine the 
record is to see that the jury actually considered special mitigation. The State 
reargues the merits of special mitigation anew, rather than admitting that the 
jury seriously considered it even without some of the most important evidence. 
During deliberations, a minority of the jury believed Scott's extreme 
emotional distress was not substantially caused by his own conduct because he 
was not the source of the distress the majority of the time. These jurors believed 
that Scott may not be to blame for the extreme emotional distress he was 
suffering at the time of the shooting. They believed that Teresa's role in their 
fighting, in the family strife, was potentially significant enough to mitigate Scott's 
guilt. They believed this even without knowing that Teresa had discussed 
shooting her gun, and without knowing Scott believed Teresa had threatened to 
shoot him. The jury believed this even without being able to put together the final 
pieces of the puzzle. 
13 
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They jury heard that when Scott entered his room and found Teresa had 
taken her gun from the safe. But what they didn't hear was that Scott believed 
Teresa had threatened to shoot Scott with that very gun. The jury was at an 
absolute impasse on the question of special mitigation without even hearing the 
evidence that tied the entire defense together. If the truncated, handicapped, 
special mitigation defense caused an absolute impasse on this issue, that could 
only be overcome by a dynamite instruction, it is no stretch to find that the ~ 
complete defense would have improved Scott's case. 
Instead of examining what happened in this case, with this jury, the State's 
brief reexamines some hand-picked evidence and argues that it does not support 
Scott's special mitigation defense. See Appellee's Replacement Brief at 35-38. It is 
as if the State wants the Court to find as a matter of law that Scott was not 
entitled to special mitigation. This is an incorrect argument. The trial court found 
there was a reasonable basis in the evidence to have the jury instructed on special 
mitigation. R.279:18. The State has not challenged that ruling. This Court is not 
called upon to revisit anew the questions about whether Scott's distress was 
extreme, whether there was a reasonable explanation, or whether Scott 
substantially caused the distress. That was the jury's job after Scott made the 
initial showing. The record shows the jury believed there were significant reasons 
to accept the mitigation defense as it was presented. The record shows the jury 
took the mitigation defense seriously, even without the threat evidence. The 
question this Court must ask is whether there is a likelihood of a more favorable 
14 
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result vvith the additional evidence supporting the mitigation defense. Instead of 
reweighing all the evidence, this Court need only consider whether there is a 
reasonable probability the jury would have felt differently about the meaning of 
"substantially caused" if it had learned Scott was worrying about the fact that 
Teresa had threatened to use that silver gun on him. 
This Court should not hesitate to find a reasonable likelihood of a more 
favorable outcome for Scott if the jury had heard the threat evidence. The record 
clearly demonstrates the jury had real concerns about whether or not Scott was 
the source of his distress. Evidence v{hich would have strongly suggested that his 
distress was caused by Teresa's threat, which he interpreted as a threat to use her 
gun on him, could easily have pushed the jury over the edge in Scott's favor. And 
even if the Court does not think the jury would have unanimously found special 
mitigation applied, there can be little doubt that the minority jurors who had 
already settled into an absolute impasse on special mitigation would have been 
fortified in their resolve not to acquiesce to a verdict. In that case, we should 
presume the trial court would have eventually agreed to a mistrial. Either way, 
these likely outcomes sufficiently establish that trial counsel's deficient 
performance prejudiced Scott's defense. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Because the trial court provided an Allen instruction which was coercive 
under the circumstances, this Court should reverse Scott's conviction and remand 
15 
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for a new trial. 
Because trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to 
properly respond to the State's incorrect hearsay objection, and thereby failing to 
admit evidence that Scott had been threatened, Scott asks the Court to reverse his 
conviction and remand for a new trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 23rd day of June, 2016. 
Dou la~Thompson 
Appointed Appellate Counsel 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that I mailed two copies of this Reply Brief, along vdth a PDF 
version, to the Utah State Attorney General, Appeals Division, P.O. Box 140854, 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 on this 23rd day of June, 2016. 
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